In a seminar on compliance, Mr Barroso says that changes are slow but progressive

"Although photography is ugly, the film is good," said Minister Roberto Barroso of the Supreme Court (STF), referring to the Brazilian political scenario. The phrase was said in the inaugural lecture of the seminar Compliance Programs: Instrument to encourage transparency, governance and the fight against corruption.

The event, which is promoted by the National School of Training and Improvement of Magistrates (Enfam), in partnership with the Superior Court of Justice (STJ) and the Fundação Getúlio Vargas Projects (FGV Projects), takes place throughout Thursday (26) in the auditorium of the STJ, in Brasilia.

The aim of the seminar is to discuss integrity programs and the fight against corruption, as well as its importance in state governance. "The programs of compliance they are composed of routines and practices designed to prevent risks of corporate responsibility arising from non-compliance with legal or regulatory obligations in addition to traditional sanctioning policies, which are based on the implementation of a sentence corresponding to the illicit practice," explained Minister Villas Bôas Cueva, scientific coordinator of the event alongside Professor Ana Frazão, from the University of Brasília (UnB).

According to the minister, compliance they turn to a change of behavior through standards of conduct to be observed and monitored by companies, administrators and employees in order to avoid committing the illicit.

Transparency

"The theme is instigating, current and, above all, indispensable to the clean country," said Minister Laurita Vaz, president of the STJ, during the opening ceremony. According to her, both in the corporate and financial markets, the implementation of compliance, as a strategic management tool, help fight corruption, in addition to improving governance and ensuring transparency, which "provides a solid basis for economic development".

For Minister Luis Felipe Solomon, who participated as president of the first panel, the event will enable a reflection on postures in the public and private field, old and current practices: "A real tank of ideas, a real proposal plant, which I am sure will be a milestone in this theme and in this special moment that Brazilian society lives."

Negative photograph

Minister Barroso’s inaugural talk was the theme Democracy, corruption and justice. In describing the current scenario of Brazilian politics, he recognized that, in a first analysis, "photography is negatively impressive".

"A president of the Republic who was twice denounced by the Attorney General of the Republic, one for passive corruption and the other for obstruction of justice. There's a former president of the Republic convicted in the first degree. There is another former president of the Republic already denounced before the Supreme Court for passive corruption; two former heads of the Civil House have already been convicted, one in the first degree and the other in the second degree, for active corruption and the other for passive corruption; a former head of the government secretariat of the presidency of the Republic is arrested preventively because supposedly it would have been found in his apartment the bagatela de R$ 50 million; two former mayors of the House of Representatives are currently under arrest; several state governors are currently responding to criminal proceedings, some prisoners. All the advisers of the Court of Auditors of a state, except one, were arrested preventively by determination of the STJ; the award-winning denunciation of Odebrecht made mention of 415 politicians from 26 parties, the award-winning collaboration of JBS involved 1,829 politicians from 28 parties. This is the photograph of the current Brazilian moment, without any value judgment," the minister said.

"An amazing episode of widespread corruption," Barroso acknowledged. However, for the minister, "film is good" because society has reacted and the country is experiencing a moment of change in attitude, changes in legislation and jurisprudence that, although slow, are progressive.

Point to point

" I think that the change in attitude begins with Criminal Action 470, known as Monthly, when, pushed by society, the Supreme Court for the first time in the history of Brazil, this is the harsh truth, punished a relevant set of people for crimes such as active corruption, passive corruption, embezzlement, money laundering, fraudulent management of financial distribution. There was an emblematic mark of change of attitude," the minister said.

Regarding the change in legislation, Barroso cited the promulgation of the law on crimes against the financial system and against the tax order, the worsening of the penalty for active and passive corruption, the money laundering law, the law defining criminal organizations, the anti-corruption law and the clean record law.

In the case-law, Barroso cited as the most important change in dealing with corruption the recognition by the Supreme Court that it is possible to execute condemnatory decisions after the second degree trial.

" It was the most important measure that was taken in Brazil, because the previous requirement of the transit on trial was that it made it impossible to execute any penalty for white collar crime. With procrastinal resources it was postponed in ten, 12, 15, 25 years the execution of decisions, until the prescription," he explained.

For him, "the seed has already been planted, hearts and minds have already been conquered", but "who was waiting for the knockout will not watch, because the fight is point to point".

Other debates

During the day, discussions are still planned on programs to combat corruption, state governance, as well as debates on the view of the academia and the market on compliance.

 

 

STJ SOURCE

PORTAL OF THE MAGISTER – Limited liability

Far from being an unjustified privilege granted to business companies, the limitation of the responsibility of the partners is an important instrument to stimulate productive investment. In fact, the perfect patrimonial separation resulting from it makes only the property of the personified society – and no longer the personal assets of the partners – answer ordinarily for the debts of the society.

By means of limited liability, the partial socialisation of the business risk is ensured, in that, in the face of the company’s patrimonial insufficiency, it will be creditors – and no longer members of limited liability – who will bear the losses. It is based on the premise that, being in everyone's interest the promotion of productive investment, it is fair and reasonable that the community as a whole can afford part of the business risk[1], ensuring aspects that are fundamental to business activity, such as legal certainty, predictability and risk calculation.

However, there are also many possibilities that the perfect patrimonial separation between society and its partners can be abused, transforming an instrument of partial socialization of business risk into an instrument of total transfer of business risk to social creditors.

This problem is especially aggravated in countries that, like Brazil, allow the use of the model of society limited by small enterprises, of a strong personal or family character – in relation to which it is difficult to have a social interest distinct from the personal and concrete interest of the partners – and still without any care regarding the formation of social capital, a value that corresponds to the contribution of the partners to the project and, in this sense, delimits the measure of the risk they are willing to take.

In fact, it is a recurrent practice in Brazilian corporate law that there are manifestly low or inconsistent social capital values with the risk to be assumed, so that, in the face of situations of asset insufficiency, the partners will be in the comfortable position of stealing responsibility for the undertaking without having ever effectively assumed a reasonable part of the risk. Hence the subcapitalisation problems[2], given that, in the face of low values, the function of share capital is completely subverted.

However, as much as it is known that social capital is not confused with social equity – this, yes, the real guarantee of creditors – it is a fact that equity insufficiency is often the result of the derisory value of social capital, a situation in which the partners do not assume the risk of the business, transferring it exclusively to the creditors of the company.

The problem increases when one realizes that the limitation of responsibility has serious consequences especially for small creditors and involuntary creditors, seen the latter as those who have never negotiated properly with society, but are creditors of it due to unlawful acts committed by it from which they were harmed.[3].

On the other hand, it is known that the big creditors, in practice, end up being protected by an "unlimited" liability, in that they have the power to bargain to surround themselves with guarantees other than the assets of society (including personal and real by the partners) or at least to consider the risk assumed for the purpose of obtaining greater advantages in the negotiations.

It is not without reason that the assumption of the economic analysis of the right that limited liability is a factor for reducing transaction costs is based on the premise that those who negotiate with a limited liability company are able to demand additional advantages as a counterpart to the higher risk they take. It does not take much deepening to realize that such reasoning only applies to creditors with bargaining power, which obviously drives away small creditors and so-called involuntary creditors.

The scenario described shows that we are facing a truly structural problem of Brazilian corporate law, which enables many injustices and distortions. And to solve the problem, the only solution that has been used is the disregard of legal personality.

It occurs that, initially confined to the hypotheses of abuse of legal personality, as provided for in Article 50 of the Civil Code, the disregard became gradually used, in several hypotheses, only in the face of the patrimonial insufficiency, and the abuse is expendable.

In fact, the so-called "minor theory"[4] it is now the rule in many fields, such as consumer law, labor law and environmental law, among others. However, such a theory in practice matters the denial of perfect patrimonial separation. As much as it is faced with small creditors or involuntary creditors, the linear application of the lower theory has perverse effects, especially in cases where the partners have adequately used limited liability and assumed their share of the business risk.

Similarly, there may be many distortions when the so-called larger theory, which requires proof of abuse, is used indiscriminately and without the proof of the deviation of purpose that should justify the accountability of the partners and administrators.

The situation becomes even more serious when one perceives that, in Brazilian law, there is no more serious reflection about the subjective effectiveness of disregarding the legal personality that, at least in cases of application of the larger theory, should preferably fall on the partners and administrators involved in the purpose deviation. However, the STJ has already decided that disregard should cover indistinctly all partners.[5].

The indiscriminate use of disregard for legal personality therefore breaks not only with the assumptions of safety and risk calculation, but even with the assumptions of justice that, in fact, are the ones that most justify its use. Although the trivialization of disregard is a reflection of the trivialization of limited responsibility, it is not always observed that the medication, depending on the dosage, can become poison.

From the moment that disregard becomes the rule, legal personality loses, in companies with limited liability partners, its effect of perfect patrimonial separation, which discourages or prevents investment and still generates high transaction costs, which will certainly be passed on to the final price of products and services. It is not without reason that some already advocate the end of limited responsibility in Brazil[6].

We have therefore come to the worst of the worlds: a world in which legal personality and limited responsibility no longer guarantee security or justice. And without any serious initiative to solve the problem structurally, we still have no hope of a solution.

 

———————————————–

[1] FRAZON, ANNA. Social function of the company: impact on civil liability of S/A controllers and administrators. Rio de Janeiro: Renovar, 2011. p. 18.

[2] See, in this sense: DINIZ, Gustavo Saad. Corporate undercapitalisation: financing and responsibility. Belo Horizonte: Forum, 2012.

[3] FRAZON, Op. cit., pp. 389-391.

[4] The standard of the 2002 diploma corresponds to what Fábio Ulhoa Coelho (Fábio Ulhoa Coelho, Course in commercial law. São Paulo: Saraiva, 2009. v. 2, p. 74) called the "greater theory of disregard", applicable as a means of restraining frauds and abuses perpetrated through the legal entity, in contrast to the minor theory, through which the patrimonial autonomy of the legal entity would be removed with the mere loss of the creditor, a distinction that the author abandoned due to the evolution of the subject in jurisprudence.

[5] It is a hypothesis of application of the larger theory, in which it was stated that "For the purposes of disregarding the legal personality, there is no distinction between the members of the limited society. Whether they are managers, administrators or minority contributors, they will all be achieved by this disregard" (STJ, 4th T., REsp. 1,250.582/MG, Rel. Min. Luis Felipe Solomon, julg. 12.4.2016, publ. DJe 31.5.2016).

[6] SALAMA, Bruno. The End of Limited Liability in Brazil: history, law and economy. São Paulo: Malheiros, 2014.

 

Ana Frazão –
Lawyer. Professor of Civil and Commercial Law at UnB. Former Adviser of CADE.

 

 

The articles published by JOTA do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the site. The texts seek to stimulate the debate on important issues for the country, always highlighting the plurality of ideas.

Official Source: https://jota.info/columns/company-and-market/limited liability-18102017.

? ? The texts, information and opinions published in this space are the full responsibility of the author. Therefore, they do not necessarily correspond to the viewpoint of the Magistrate's Portal.

 

EXAMINATION: It's too early to know if Cade's more strict, says former counselor

It's too early to know if Cade's more strict, says former counselor

For former advisor Ana Frazão, Brazilian capitalism is of compadrio and proximity between state and private sector facilitates corruption

In the last two months, the Administrative Council for Economic Defense (Cade) refused two major mergers between companies in Brazil, the purchase of the educational group Estacio by Kroton and the fuel distributor Ale for Ipiranga. In addition, the body’s general oversight, the technical area that evaluates operations, barred the purchase of Time Warner by AT&T in the country – the case must now be judged by the court of the body.

Recent movements have led lawyers working with a corporate right to see a change of posture in the municipality. To know if that's a consummated fact, TEST talked to jurist Ana Frazon, former organ advisor and that this week released the book Competition Law - Presupposition and Perspective. Anna agrees that reprobations are rare, but she says it's too early to know if this is a trend in Cade. On this subject, competition and influence of corruption in business, she granted the following interview.

Recently, Cade has made tougher decisions regarding major mergers, as was the case with Kroton and the Stage and Ipiranga with Ale. Is that a trend?

It's too early to make sense. We are talking about two operations that are, say, delicate in sectors where there were already a relatively large number of these operations. Of course it's an important sign. In fact, reprobations are rare, usually there is an attempt to negotiate. But it's still early, considering the peculiarities Cade has to make sense. Cade's current president, Alexandre Barreto, said in an interview with EXAME that decisions mean a maturity in jurisprudence. What happens in these cases, as I said, are markets that were already consolidated, which had already been through a number of previous operations.

The fact that Cade was quoted in Joesley Batista's report as having been specifically influenced by a decision by former deputy Rodrigo Rocha Loures may have to do with this change of posture?

Nope. From everything I know about Cade, I can tell you for sure nothing happened. First, there was a mere call between authorities. Cade always had the policy of listening to everyone who was interested. Surely this has not altered at all any process that is there. Neither that particular nor others. Of course, a question like this puts the municipality in a position of visibility, but Cade always had this kind of visibility by judging complex causes and yet he never let himself influence or pressure himself. This type of question in the window is part of the practice and daily life of the municipality.

Can the political-economic moment influence decisions of the municipality?

Not the political moment. Cade has been building a history of political independence since 1994. Of course it does not mean that he is totally indifferent to economic-political issues, because he judges in the context of a real country with all the problems. The crisis is taken into account in the analyses. Sometimes certain policies have a direct influence on the market and are taken into account. But the body is mature enough to be influenced by political issues. Economic policies change business scenarios, but I advocate that Cade should not be held hostage because the policies that have to suit the market, the market cannot be held hostage to the policy of one government or the other, especially in cases where they do not conform to the law.

Has the change in competition law in 2012 contributed to changes in Cade?

Competition regulation is an important aspect, but it is not the only one. I've always argued that the anti-trust system and anti-corruption need to go together. Corruption is a way of achieving advantages that do not derive from its merit, competition is the opposite. In this sense, the more we ensure a competitive environment, the more we help in combating corruption. The law is important because it consolidates efforts that have come since the law of 1994 and monitors the system in various ways. One of them is the control of the structure of the companies in the process of merger, which became prior. Before things happened before Cade's decision was made. After the operation was completed, it was much harder to say no because of the economic upheaval that could generate. Can you imagine saying no to any of these recent cases after the companies were already one?

Do you think that Brazilian capitalism, even by its historical origin, is of compadrio? What could change that?

I have no doubt that he is of compadrio. Now, it is important to mention that I start from the premise that no capitalism is immune to any kind of political influence, even in the United States this happens to a certain extent. The lobby discussion there is very current and helps to show that in any country, if there is no proper care, economic influence ends up permeating political power so that it gives the facilities to those interested. If this is true for everyone, it is even more true for Brazil. Often economic agents do not want to take the risk that is inherent to capitalism and end up seeing in the state a protector, an incentive, and press for these facilities. We have a very weak market and so a bank like the strong BNDES shows how capitalism depends on the state. And that leads to other problems. The greater the relationship between state and private market, the greater the possibilities of corruption, which is what we are seeing. Now, that is true for the great economic agents and there is the exception for the minors. I assume that the small and medium-sized businessman, who are true heroes in the country, could be better watched.

How do we reduce this proximity and, consequently, try to hinder corruption?

Of course it involves a political issue, but there are several legal instruments. Firstly, lobbying control and regulation is essential. Total transparency of relations between public and private actors. Control of who public agents receive and when this happens, what additional remuneration these agents can receive from private entities, etc. Nothing like transparency to mitigate corruption.

But in the United States a regulation for the lobby considered too harsh ended up taking some lobbyists into the shadows again, some have ceased to register as such, and so it has even been seen as a setback. Don't we take that risk?

This lobbyist may no longer register, but if the authority has an obligation to tell us who met, whether registered or not, we will know about it. Regulations create these obligations for authority. Of course they'll be able to take it. You will be able to create another moment for this discussion, during an informal dinner or playing golf, as happens there. But then civil society has to try to monitor it somehow. Because if we do, this is a problem in a certain way insoluble. It is difficult to imagine any change if people are not willing to comply, but with an adequate structure for agents to stick their work by ethics, we take a big step in this direction, even without being assured of absolute effectiveness.

The economic team has been working on a new law of judicial recovery. Why is this important to the country’s business environment?

Porque a ideia hoje é de que a empresa não diz respeito apenas aos interesses do empresário. Há uma série de interesses de consumidores, trabalhadores, fornecedores. A ideia é ter um sistema adequado para possibilitar a recuperação das empresas sem prejudicar essas outras partes. A falência deve ser o último recurso. Porém, após alguns anos da nossa lei atual, vimos que algumas soluções não são tão adequadas como pareciam ser. Empresas que não deveriam obter recuperação acabam tendo, o que tem efeitos nocivos para a economia. Já podemos medir o que deu certo e o que não.

Inclusive simplificando a retirada de empresários da operação de empresas em recuperação?

A própria lei já possibilita a sucessão em uma série de circunstâncias. Certamente a discussão sobre a alienação de controle acaba acontecendo parcialmente nesses casos de estabelecimentos, ou entes produtivos, ou pode acontecer na própria circunstância na decretação de falência.

Mas a lógica fora do Brasil é que se retire os empresários e aqui está funcionando um pouco diferente. Somos mais complacentes?

Tenho defendido que em casos de corrupção, por exemplo, haja alienação. Há um impasse quando o dano é muito alto e a empresa vai quebrar. Mas se o controlador dessa empresa ficar, ele vai ser beneficiado de uma multa menor para não quebrar a empresa que ele deixou nessa situação. Deveria haver uma alienação do controle para que esse controlador que agiu de forma errada não tenha nenhum benefício. Temos que ter algum ponto para não salvar o controlador, mas temos que manter a empresa. Não é que seja uma questão simples, mas em situações extraordinárias, tem de ser pensadas alternativas para que as empresas sejam mantidas com outro controlador.

 

 

 


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CORREIO BRAZILIENSE: ‘Democracy requires competition’, analyzes lawyer Ana Frazão

'Democracy demands competition', analyzes lawyer Ana Frazão

For her, competitive market is essential to end corruption and secure consumer rights

By Alessandra Alves

Ana Rayssa/Esp. CB/D.A Press
 
Combating corruption seems to be an objective on the agenda of all Brazilians in recent times. For many, Operation Lava-Jato, which entered the 45th phase last week, is the way to get Brazil back on track. But for jurist Ana Frazão, a specialist in competitive law, the operation is only the tip of the iceberg and is far from a miraculous solution. "If the market remains addicted, the country will only replace the corrupt," he warned. For the former Advisor of the Administrative Council for Economic Defense (Cade), the authority responsible for overseeing corporate abuses, structural corruption is directly related to the disregard of the right to free competition.
 
 
Among the many positive consequences, the appreciation of competitive law results in the strengthening of democracy, the development of the country and the guarantee of consumer rights, the lawyer explains. "It is an excellent mechanism to ensure the functioning of democratic institutions, because it prevents them from being corrupted by economic power," he argues. In people's daily lives, competitive practices bring lower prices, variety of products and innovation, highlighted the specialist, who launched last week the book Competition Law — Assumptions and Perspectives.
 
In a nutshell, Ana Frazão paralleled anticompetitive practices such as cartel formation and problems that insist on spreading across the country, such as poverty, inequality and unemployment. Ensuring free competition is essential both to fulfill the basic needs of society and those of the government, even in relation to structural reforms, highlights. Next, the main excerpts of the interview given to the Mail:
 
How does competitive law have to do with people's daily lives?
I would say that it is a presupposition of democracy, because it prevents democratic institutions from being corrupted by economic power. Both cartel formation and corruption, for example, create an access barrier. Those who do not pay bribes cannot enter certain markets. But if you pay bribes, it already has a much higher cost, which will obviously be passed on, creating a snowball in which the biggest damage is the consumer. Ensuring adequate competitive conditions is what makes it possible for the population to have access to cheaper products and services, with better quality and innovation. In the end, we are talking about a concrete well-being for people. And they've been more interested in the matter.
 
Does this increase in interest have to do with the wave of anti-corruption, for example, the Jet Wash?
I prefer not to hitch one thing to another, because I still think that the problem of corruption in Brazil has been treated in a short-sighted way. People still think the Jet Wash is miraculous. It has numerous positive points, but we will not solve the problem of corruption if we do not change the market institutions. If not, we just go out swapping gangs of crooks for other gangs of crooks. If the market remains addicted and culture remains that of corruption, things will not change overnight. On the one hand, the car wash, in my view, didn't help. I'm afraid until she got in the way, in this sense of exceedingly stimulating an perspective that is a miraculous solution, that we put everyone in jail and solve, when, in fact, we know that the path is much longer, involves much more comprehensive measures.
 
What needs to be done if the goal is really to end corruption?
It is essential to change the competitive conditions of the markets involved. There are many ways. One that has become very popular today and I particularly like very much is compliance (internal research policy and fraud prevention). But obviously that's not simple, it's no use having a compliance program if it's not effective, if only for English to see. Another way is to strengthen cooperation between individuals and competitive authorities.
 
The leniency agreements?
Yeah. Sometimes people don't understand, they think leniency is a way of solving easily, as if it were a benefit to the agent who's demanding it. But if used well, it is fundamental. For example, the cartel's great difficulty is to get enough proof to say that this is not a mere price coincidence, it came from an agreement between competitors who wanted a certain type of result. That is where the policy of leniency agreements comes in. It generates evidence.
 
The criticism is that companies end up receiving benefits, despite having committed crimes. Many controllers continue to run the company, even after confessing crimes. Isn't that bad?
What we've seen today is that if we're going to collect all the damage the company has done, it'll break. That's why you're beginning to think about flexibilizing compensation. But if it makes the controller's compensation more flexible, somehow he's taking advantage of the illicit he's committed. We end up benefiting the controller who was often responsible for the practices. That's the fight.
 
How to resolve this situation?
Getting him out of charge seems to me the solution, because it protects the company as an activity, not him. The preservation of the company is very important, but it is not confused with controller preservation. The important thing is to keep the activity, the jobs and all the wealth it generates. Nothing prevents the manager from compulsorily fined to ensure that a new manager can effectively implement agreed practices.
 
Has this been done?
No, it hasn't been done, and it's a big problem.
 
Why?
There are a number of reasons. But the fact that the anti-corruption law clearly does not allow this kind of measure creates many impasses.
 
Keeping them in control is a more naive or lazy option?
Maybe both. I'd say that's a conservative option. I think this solution has never been pointed out because, in Brazil, legislation is often excessively tolerant to the holders of economic power. It's an argument people prefer to avoid.
 
There's a lot of talk about reform. Is it the case that there is also a substantive change in anti-corruption laws that ensure free competition?
In the competitive context, Cade has greater support, because the anticompetitive law says that it can adopt any remedy to restore competitive conditions. What is missing is often structure. The situation of the anti-corruption law is a little more delicate, it is legislation that needs a series of repairs.
 
What could be improved?
I believe that one of the most urgent issues is the harmonisation of the competences of the various entities involved, especially in the leniency agreements. These agreements presuppose incentives, and there are incentives only if there is legal certainty. How will the parties feel encouraged if there are several authorities involved? It has TCU (Union Account Court), CGU (EU General Control), AGU (Union General Advocacy) and MP (Public Ministry). Today, the company makes a deal with one and thinks the problem is solved, but comes to another and says it does not recognize. It gets unnecessarily complicated.
 
Is solving competitive problems as important as the other reforms the government has made?
Sem dúvida nenhuma. A questão concorrencial é muito sensível. Se não é a mais importante — é até difícil dizer, porque não tem como fazer essa priorização —, certamente é uma das mais.
 
Então, de certa forma, o governo está fechando os olhos tanto para a parte dessa mudanças nas leis, quanto para a parte operacional, ao negar recursos necessários ao Cade?
Acredito que sim. Há situações como ter um conselheiro com um assessor ou dois, como foi o meu caso nos três anos em que fui conselheira. Isso me preocupa, porque o cenário futuro vai exigir grandes investimentos em tecnologia para tudo. Claro que o governo vai dizer que o Brasil está em uma situação horrível, não tem dinheiro para nada. Mas acho que as pessoas ainda não perceberam que a proteção da concorrência é uma questão prioritária.
 
Como o cidadão perceberia os efeitos de uma legislação que funciona?
Quanto mais o mercado valoriza mérito e eficiência, mais os agentes vão se sentir motivados a baixar preços, a investir em qualidade e em inovação. Hoje existe uma discussão muito importante do uso do direito da concorrência para a diminuição da pobreza, porque permite que as camadas mais pobres tenham acesso a produtos. Um mercado pouco competitivo é um estímulo para a corrupção e para a pobreza, porque a tendência é que os preços fiquem mais altos, o que onera exatamente a camada mais pobre, em termos proporcionais. Práticas anticoncorrenciais impedem acesso a mercados, principalmente de pequenos empresários. Quando as empresas têm mais condições de se manter no mercado, certamente há repercussão na geração de empregos.


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